Philosophical research in AI has hitherto largely focused on the ethics of AI. In this paper we, an ethicist of belief and a machine learning scientist, suggest that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI - the epistemology of AI, and in particular an ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief, a field that has been defined in various ways, to refer to a sub-field within epistemology. This subfield is concerned with the study of possible moral, practical, and other non-alethic dimensions of belief. And in this paper, we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what agents - both human and artificial - ought to believe, rather than with descriptive questions concerning whether certain beliefs meet various evaluative standards such as being true, being justified or warranted, constituting knowledge, and so on. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI; morally owed beliefs; pragmatic and moral encroachment on AI beliefs; and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven't yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI.

翻译：迄今，人工智能领域的哲学研究主要聚焦于人工智能伦理。在本文中，我们——一位信念伦理学家与一位机器学习科学家——提出需要开拓人工智能哲学研究的新领域：人工智能认识论，尤其是人工智能信念伦理学。此处我们将信念伦理学（该领域已有多种界定方式）视为认识论的一个子领域，主要研究信念可能存在的道德、实践及其他非真理维度。本文主要关注信念伦理学中的规范性议题，即探究各类主体（包括人类与人工智能）应当相信什么，而非描述性问题——例如某些信念是否符合真实性、正当性、合理性等评价标准。我们提出当前（人类）信念伦理学中的四个可迁移至人工智能信念伦理学的议题：人工智能的不当信念伤害；道德应得信念；实践与道德因素对人工智能信念的侵蚀；以及人工智能信念的道德责任。同时指出两个尚未被普遍承认为人工智能信念伦理研究，但因其探究信念的道德与实践维度而确实属于该领域的新兴哲学研究方向：人工智能的认知与伦理去殖民化；以及人工智能中的认知不正义。