Standard decision frameworks address uncertainty about facts but assume fixed options and values. We extend the Jeffrey-Bolker framework to model refinements in values and prove a value-of-information theorem for axiological refinement. In multi-agent settings, we establish that mutual refinement will characteristically transform zero-sum games into positive-sum interactions and yield Pareto-improvements in Nash bargaining. These results show that a framework of rational choice can be extended to model value refinement. By unifying epistemic and axiological refinement under a single formalism, we broaden the conceptual foundations of rational choice and illuminate the normative status of ethical deliberation.

翻译：标准决策框架处理事实不确定性，但假设选项与价值固定不变。我们扩展了Jeffrey-Bolker框架以建模价值演变，并证明了关于价值学演化的信息价值定理。在多智能体场景中，我们论证了相互价值演化将典型地使零和博弈转变为正和互动，并在纳什谈判中产生帕累托改进。这些结果表明，理性选择框架可被扩展以建模价值演化。通过将认知演化与价值学演化统一于单一形式体系，我们拓展了理性选择的概念基础，并阐明了伦理反思的规范性地位。