We analyze the overall benefits of an energy community cooperative game under which distributed energy resources (DER) are shared behind a regulated distribution utility meter under a general net energy metering (NEM) tariff. Two community DER scheduling algorithms are examined. The first is a community with centrally controlled DER, whereas the second is decentralized letting its members schedule their own DER locally. For both communities, we prove that the cooperative game's value function is superadditive, hence the grand coalition achieves the highest welfare. We also prove the balancedness of the cooperative game under the two DER scheduling algorithms, which means that there is a welfare re-distribution scheme that de-incentivizes players from leaving the grand coalition to form smaller ones. Lastly, we present five ex-post and an ex-ante welfare re-distribution mechanisms and evaluate them in simulation, in addition to investigating the performance of various community sizes under the two DER scheduling algorithms.

翻译：我们分析了能源社区合作博弈的整体效益，在此博弈中，分布式能源资源（DER）在通用净能量计量（NEM）电价机制下，于受监管的配电计量表后方实现共享。我们探讨两种社区DER调度算法：第一种是拥有集中可控DER的社区，第二种是允许成员自主调度本地DER的去中心化社区。对于这两种社区，我们证明合作博弈的价值函数具有超可加性，因此大联盟能实现最高福利。同时，我们证明两种DER调度算法下合作博弈的平衡性，这意味着存在一种福利再分配方案，能抑制参与者脱离大联盟组建小团体的动机。最后，我们提出五种事后福利再分配机制和一种事前福利再分配机制，并通过仿真评估其效果，此外还研究了两种DER调度算法下不同规模社区的性能表现。