Private set intersection (PSI) aims to allow users to find out the commonly shared items among the users without revealing other membership information. The most recently proposed approach to PSI in the database community was Prism, which is built upon secret sharing and the assumption that multiple non-colluding servers are available. One limitation of Prism lies in its semantic security: the encoding on the servers is deterministic, implying that the scheme cannot be indistinguishable under a chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). This paper extends the original PSI scheme of Prism by two orthogonal primitives, namely Kaleido-RND and Kaleido-AES: the former exhibits highly efficient performance with randomized encoding and the latter is provably secure under CPA attacks with more computational overhead. A system prototype is implemented and deployed on a 34-node cluster of SQLite instances. Extensive experiments on the TPC-H benchmark and three real-world applications confirm the effectiveness of the proposed Kaleido primitives.

翻译：私有集合交集（PSI）旨在允许用户在不泄露其他成员信息的情况下，找出用户之间共同拥有的项目。数据库领域最近提出的PSI方案是Prism，该方案基于秘密共享和多个不共谋服务器可用的假设。Prism的一个局限性在于其语义安全性：服务器上的编码是确定性的，这意味着该方案无法在选定明文攻击（IND-CPA）下实现不可区分性。本文通过两种正交原语（即Kaleido-RND和Kaleido-AES）对Prism的原始PSI方案进行了扩展：前者以随机化编码实现高效性能，后者在CPA攻击下可证明安全，但计算开销更大。我们在34节点的SQLite实例集群上实现并部署了一个系统原型。在TPC-H基准测试和三个真实世界应用上的大量实验证实了所提出的Kaleido原语的有效性。