Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest.

翻译：移动边缘计算要求网络运营商承担巨额基础设施投资，而大部分收益却被提供终端应用的服务提供商获取。这种成本与收益的不平衡抑制了运营商部署移动边缘计算的积极性，尽管低延迟和带宽密集型服务的需求持续增长。本文提出了一种联合投资方案，即由一个运营商和多个服务提供商组成的参与方，在多个决策周期内共同部署、维护和共享移动边缘计算基础设施。我们设计了一种新的联盟博弈模型，用于刻画资源规划、参与方间资源分配以及成本与收益分摊。为应对波动的用户需求和变化的参与激励，我们构建了一种机制，该机制可更新资源并允许参与方随时间动态进入和退出。我们通过补偿方案维持合作。数值结果表明，将资源更新与动态参与相结合可提高总收益并增强运营商的投资激励。