Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest.

翻译：移动边缘计算（MEC）要求网络运营商承担大量的基础设施投资，而大部分收入却被提供终端用户应用的服务提供商所获取。这种成本与收入的不平衡抑制了运营商对MEC部署的投资，尽管低延迟和带宽密集型服务的需求日益增长。本文提出一种联合投资方案，其中参与者（即一个网络运营商和多个服务提供商）在多个决策周期内共同部署、维护并共享MEC基础设施。我们设计了一种新的联盟博弈模型，该模型捕捉了资源规划、参与者间的资源分配以及成本与收入的共享。为应对波动的用户需求和不断变化的参与激励，我们提出了一种机制，该机制能够更新资源并允许参与者随时间动态进入和退出。我们通过补偿方案维持合作。数值结果表明，资源更新与动态参与的结合能提高总收益，并增强网络运营商的投资激励。