The Step out-Step in sequencing game is a particular example of a game from the sequencing game framework of Curiel, Perderzoli, and Tijs, where coalitions of players in a queue may reorder themselves to improve the their overall cost, under some restrictions. Musegaas, Borm and Quant proved, in two papers, that a simple greedy algorithm correctly computes the valuation of a coalition, and that the game is convex. These proofs entail rather involved case analyses; in this note, we give short proofs of both results.

翻译：排序游戏的“跨步出局”是从Curiel、Perderzoli和Tijs的顺序游戏框架中的一个特别例子。 在Tijs的顺序游戏框架中,队列中的球员联盟可能会根据某些限制重新排序,提高整体成本。 Musegaas、Borm和Quant在两份论文中证明,简单的贪婪算法正确计算了一个联盟的估值,而游戏是骗局。这些证据涉及相当多的案例分析;在本说明中,我们给出了两种结果的简短证据。