In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their strategies, indicating their preferred quantity at any given market price. Producers and consumers may wish to act as both, i.e., prosumers. In this paper, we examine the behavior of profit-maximizing prosumers in a uniform-price market for resource allocation with the objective of maximizing the social welfare. We propose a scalar-parameterized function bidding mechanism for the prosumers, in which we establish the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we provide an efficient way to compute the Nash equilibrium through the computation of the market allocation at the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present a case study to illustrate the welfare loss under different variations of market parameters, such as the market's supply capacity and inelastic demand.

翻译：在统一价格市场中，供应商竞相向消费者供应资源，由此产生的单一市场价格由其竞争决定。为获得充分灵活性，生产者和消费者倾向于将函数作为其策略进行承诺，该函数表明他们在任意给定市场价格下的偏好数量。生产者和消费者可能希望同时扮演这两种角色，即成为产消者。本文研究了以社会福利最大化为目标的资源分配统一价格市场中，追求利润最大化的产消者的行为。我们提出了一种适用于产消者的标量参数化函数投标机制，并证明了该机制下纳什均衡的存在性与唯一性。此外，我们提供了一种通过计算纳什均衡下的市场分配来高效求解纳什均衡的方法。最后，我们通过案例研究说明了不同市场参数变化（如市场供给能力和无弹性需求）下的福利损失情况。