A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp for imperfectly rational agents, but also understand the ensuing limitations on the class of mechanisms that enforce it. In this context, the concept of OSP mechanisms has assumed a prominent role since they provably account for the absence of contingent reasoning skills, a specific cognitive limitation. For single-dimensional agents, it is known that OSP mechanisms need to use certain greedy algorithms. In this work, we introduce a notion that interpolates between OSP and SOSP, a more stringent notion where agents only plan a subset of their own future moves. We provide an algorithmic characterization of this novel class of mechanisms for single-dimensional domains and binary allocation problems, that precisely measures the interplay between simplicity and implementability. We build on this to show how mechanisms based on reverse greedy algorithms (a.k.a., deferred acceptance auctions) are algorithmically more robust to imperfectly rationality than those adopting greedy algorithms.

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