The development of quantum computers has been advancing rapidly in recent years. As quantum computers become more widely accessible, potentially malicious users could try to execute their code on the machines to leak information from other users, to interfere with or manipulate the results of other users, or to reverse engineer the underlying quantum computer architecture and its intellectual property, for example. Among different security threats, previous work has demonstrated information leakage across the reset operations, and it then proposed a secure reset operation could be an enabling technology that allows the sharing of a quantum computer among different users, or among different quantum programs of the same user. This work first shows a set of new, extended reset operation attacks that could be more stealthy by hiding the intention of the attacker's circuit. This work shows various masking circuits and how attackers can retrieve information from the execution of a previous shot of a circuit, even if the masking circuit is used between the reset operation (of the victim, after the shot of the circuit is executed) and the measurement (of the attacker). Based on the uncovered new possible attacks, this work proposes a set of heuristic checks that could be applied at transpile time to check for the existence of malicious circuits that try to steal information via the attack on the reset operation. Unlike run-time protection or added secure reset gates, this work proposes a complimentary, compile-time security solution to the attacks on reset~operation.

翻译：近年来，量子计算机的发展日新月异。随着量子计算机的普及，潜在恶意用户可能试图在其上执行代码，以窃取其他用户的信息、干扰或操控其他用户的结果，或对底层量子计算机架构及其知识产权进行逆向工程等。在各种安全威胁中，已有研究展示了通过复位操作的信息泄露，并提出安全的复位操作可作为一项使能技术，允许多个用户或同一用户的不同量子程序共享一台量子计算机。本文首先展示了一组新的、扩展的复位操作攻击，这些攻击通过隐藏攻击者电路的意图而更具隐蔽性。本文展示了多种掩蔽电路，并说明即使用户在复位操作（受害者在电路执行后进行的操作）与测量（攻击者进行的操作）之间使用了掩蔽电路，攻击者仍能从前一次电路执行中检索信息。基于这些新发现的攻击可能性，本文提出了一组可在编译时应用的启发式检查方法，用于检测是否存在试图通过复位操作攻击窃取信息的恶意电路。与运行时保护或添加安全复位门不同，本文提出了一种可互补的编译时安全解决方案，以应对针对复位操作的攻击。