Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.

翻译：关于人工智能（AI）及其潜在存在风险的担忧已引起广泛关注，杰弗里·辛顿和丹尼斯·哈萨比斯等人物倡导建立强有力的防护措施以防范灾难性后果。尼克·博斯特罗姆和马克斯·泰格马克等知名学者通过探索超级智能AI的长期影响，进一步推动了相关讨论。然而，这种存在风险叙事面临批评，特别是在大众媒体中，蒂姆尼特·格布鲁、梅拉妮·米切尔和尼克·克莱格等学者认为，该叙事分散了对当前紧迫问题的关注。尽管媒体进行了广泛报道，但对存在风险论述的怀疑态度在学术文献中却鲜有严谨的探讨。为应对这种不平衡，本文重构并评估了反对存在风险视角的三个常见论点：分散注意力论点、人类脆弱性论点和干预检查点论点。通过对这些论点进行系统性重构与评估，本文旨在为更平衡的学术讨论及AI的进一步研究奠定基础。