Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a technology that allows groups of vehicles to form in automated, tightly-coupled platoons. CACC schemes exploit Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communications to exchange information between vehicles. However, the use of communication networks brings security concerns as it exposes network access points that the adversary can exploit to disrupt the vehicles' operation and even cause crashes. In this manuscript, we present a sensitivity analysis of CACC schemes against a class of resource-limited attacks. We present a modelling framework that allows us to systematically compute outer ellipsoidal approximations of reachable sets induced by attacks. We use the size of these sets as a security metric to quantify the potential damage of attacks affecting different signals in a CACC-controlled vehicle and study how two key system parameters change this metric. We carry out a sensitivity analysis for two different controller implementations (as given the available sensors there is an infinite number of realizations of the same controller) and show how different controller realizations can significantly affect the impact of attacks. We present extensive simulation experiments to illustrate the results.

翻译：合作式自适应巡航控制（CACC）是一种允许车辆编组形成自动化紧密队列的技术。CACC方案利用车对车（V2V）无线通信在车辆间交换信息。然而，通信网络的使用带来了安全隐患，因为它暴露了网络接入点，攻击者可利用这些接入点干扰车辆运行甚至引发碰撞。本文针对一类资源受限攻击，对CACC方案进行了敏感性分析。我们提出了一种建模框架，能够系统性地计算攻击所引发可达集的外部椭球近似。以这些集合的大小作为安全度量指标，量化攻击影响CACC控制车辆中不同信号时可能造成的潜在损害，并研究两个关键系统参数如何改变该指标。我们对两种不同的控制器实现方式（鉴于可用传感器，同一控制器存在无限种实现形式）进行了敏感性分析，并展示了不同控制器实现如何显著影响攻击的后果。最后通过大量仿真实验来验证分析结果。