We study a shared infrastructure deployed by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and used by multiple firms that generate revenues through resource usage. We focus on a challenging setting where: (i) infrastructure deployment requires substantial upfront investment, which the InP must recover via payments by firms that depend on their uncertain future revenues; (ii) firms' resource usage is jointly influenced by exogenous factors, infrastructure pricing, operational costs, and resource congestion; and (iii) firms exhibit heterogeneous risk aversion. This setting is typical in emerging technologies, e.g., Mobile Edge Computing (MEC). We formalize this setting as a novel Stackelberg game with risk-aware take-or-pay contracting and firm-side operational and congestion costs, in which the InP acts as the leader and jointly optimizes capacity dimensioning and access pricing, while firms act as followers that share the infrastructure and commit upfront to future resource usage under uncertain revenues. Followers' heterogeneous risk aversion is modeled through Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR). We prove the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), in which the followers' decisions constitute a generalized Nash equilibrium, and develop a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an approximate SE with a bounded optimality gap. We also derive a lower bound on the followers' Probability of Profit (PoP). Monte Carlo simulations for a MEC case study show that higher followers' risk aversion reduces infrastructure capacity, pricing, and leader profit, while increasing followers' PoP.

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