Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) enables efficient sharing of wireless resources to support emerging applications, but it also introduces new sensing-based security vulnerabilities. Here, potential communication security threats include confidential messages intended for legitimate users being intercepted, and unauthorized receivers (Eves) passively exploiting target echoes to infer sensing parameters without users being aware. Despite these risks, the joint protection of sensing and communication security in ISAC systems remains unexplored. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a dual-secure ISAC framework that simultaneously protects sensing and communication against passive sensing Eves and communication Eves, without requiring their channel state information (CSI). Specifically, transmit beamformers are jointly designed to inject artificial noise (AN) to introduce interference to communication Eves, while deliberately distorting the reference signal available to sensing Eves to impair their sensing capability. Furthermore, the proposed design generates artificial ghosts (AGs) with fake angle-delay-Doppler profiles. The legitimate sensing receiver can suppress these AGs using its prior knowledge of the true target directions, whereas sensing Eves cannot, thereby significantly reducing their probability of correctly detecting the true targets. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed framework effectively enhances both communication and sensing security, while preserving the performance of communication users and legitimate sensing receivers.

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