Coalition logic is a central logic in strategic reasoning studies. In this paper, we first argue that Coalition Logic models, concurrent game models, have three too-strong assumptions. The first one is the independence of agents; that is, the merge of two available joint actions of two disjoint coalitions is always available for the union of the two coalitions. The second one is seriality; that is, coalitions always have available joint actions. The third one is determinism, that is, the grand coalition's joint actions always have a unique outcome. Second, we present a coalition logic based on general concurrent game models, which do not have the three assumptions. We show the completeness of this logic and compare it with Coalition Logic in detail. This logic seems minimal in the context of strategic reasoning.

翻译：联盟逻辑是策略推理研究中的核心逻辑。本文首先论证，联盟逻辑模型（并发博弈模型）存在三个过强的假设：第一是智能体独立性，即两个不相交联盟的可用联合行动的组合始终对这两个联盟的并集可用；第二是序列性，即联盟始终具有可用的联合行动；第三是确定性，即大联盟的联合行动始终产生唯一结果。其次，我们提出了一种基于一般并发博弈模型的联盟逻辑，该模型不包含上述三个假设。我们证明了该逻辑的完备性，并与联盟逻辑进行了详细比较。在策略推理的语境下，这一逻辑似乎是最简明的。