We propose a novel quantum-resistant mutual authentication scheme for radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems. Our scheme uses lattice-based cryptography and, in particular, achieves quantum-resistance by leveraging the hardness of the inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS) problem. In contrast to prior work, which assumes that the reader-server communication channel is secure, our scheme is secure even when both the reader-server and tag-reader communication channels are insecure. Our proposed protocol provides robust security against man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, impersonation, and reflection attacks, while also ensuring unforgeability and preserving anonymity. We present a detailed security analysis, including semi-formal analysis and formal verification using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool. In addition, we analyze the storage, computation, and communication costs of the proposed protocol and compare its security properties with those of existing protocols, demonstrating that our scheme offers strong security guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first quantum-resistant authentication protocol for RFID systems that comprehensively addresses the insecurity of both the reader-server and tag-reader communication channels.

翻译：我们提出了一种面向射频识别（RFID）系统的量子安全双向认证方案。该方案采用格密码技术，通过利用非齐次短整数解（ISIS）问题的困难性实现量子安全性。与假设读写器-服务器通信信道安全的现有工作不同，本方案在读写器-服务器信道与标签-读写器信道均不安全的情况下仍能保证安全性。所述协议能够有效抵御中间人（MITM）、重放、假冒和反射攻击，同时确保不可伪造性与匿名性。我们进行了详细的安全分析，包括半形式化分析以及利用自动验证互联网安全协议与应用（AVISPA）工具的形式化验证。此外，我们分析了该协议的存储、计算与通信开销，并将其安全属性与现有协议进行对比，证明该方案具有强大的安全保证。据我们所知，本文是首个全面解决RFID系统读写器-服务器与标签-读写器双信道不安全问题的量子安全认证协议。