We extend the notion of boycotts in cooperative games from one-on-one boycotts between single players to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex game offer a proper setting for studying the impact of boycotts. Boycotts have a heterogenous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.

翻译：我们将合作博弈中的抵制概念从单个玩家之间的一对一抵制扩展到联盟之间的抵制。我们证明凸博弈为研究抵制的影响提供了合适的框架。抵制具有异质性效应。在多对一抵制中被针对的个体玩家损失最大，而未参与的玩家实际上可能从抵制中获益。