Software-defined networking (SDN) separates the control plane from the data plane and exposes the network through software applications and open APIs. The same programmability that drove its adoption also turned the network into a large body of software, and that software can be vulnerable. Knowing where and how SDN software fails is a prerequisite for defending it, yet the literature offers no consolidated account of the problem. We address this gap with a systematic literature review of 113 primary studies published between 2012 and 2025 on the security of the software that makes up SDN. We study how each software component becomes vulnerable, how attackers exploit it, which testing and analysis techniques expose its defects, and how the field has evolved. The review yields a taxonomy of vulnerabilities and attack vectors organized by SDN software component, a synthesis of the methods used to find software defects in each component, and a set of open problems that mark the most promising directions for future work. Earlier surveys treat SDN security as a networking problem; ours is, to our knowledge, the first to treat SDN components as software artifacts whose code, logic, and interactions can be defective. Our artifacts are available at https://github.com/mad975/SDNSoftwareSecurity_SLR.

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