We give a simpler analysis of the ascending auction of Bikhchandani, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra to sell a welfare-maximizing base of a matroid at Vickrey prices. The new proofs for economic efficiency and the charge of Vickrey prices only require a few matroid folklore theorems, therefore shortening the analysis of the design goals of the auction significantly.

翻译：我们对比克钱达尼、德弗里斯、舒默和沃赫拉提出的用于以维克里价格出售拟阵福利最大化基的上升拍卖，给出了一种更简洁的分析方法。关于经济效率和维克里价格收取的新证明仅需少数拟阵基础定理，从而显著缩短了对该拍卖设计目标的分析过程。