Thanks to technologies such as virtual network function the Fifth Generation (5G) of mobile networks dynamically allocate resources to different types of users in an on-demand fashion. Virtualization extends up to the 5G core, where software-defined networks and network slicing implement a customizable environment. These technologies can be controlled via application programming interfaces and web technologies, inheriting hence their security risks and settings. An attacker exploiting vulnerable implementations of the 5G core may gain privileged control of the network assets and disrupt its availability. However, there is currently no security assessment of the web security of the 5G core network. In this paper, we present the first security assessment of the 5G core from a web security perspective. We use the STRIDE threat modeling approach to define a complete list of possible threat vectors and associated attacks. Thanks to a suite of security testing tools, we cover all of these threats and test the security of the 5G core. In particular, we test the three most relevant open-source 5G core implementations, i.e., Open5GS, Free5Gc, and OpenAirInterface. Our analysis shows that all these cores are vulnerable to at least two of our identified attack vectors, demanding increased security measures in the development of future 5G core networks.

翻译：得益于虚拟网络功能等技术，第五代（5G）移动网络能够按需动态分配资源以满足不同类型用户的需求。虚拟化技术延伸至5G核心网，软件定义网络和网络切片在此实现了可定制化的环境。这些技术可通过应用程序编程接口和Web技术进行控制，从而继承了相应的安全风险与配置。攻击者利用5G核心网的脆弱实现可能获得网络资产的权限控制并破坏其可用性。然而，当前尚未有对5G核心网Web安全性的评估研究。本文首次从Web安全视角对5G核心网进行安全性评估。采用STRIDE威胁建模方法定义了完整的潜在威胁向量及关联攻击列表。通过一套安全测试工具，我们覆盖了所有威胁类型并测试了5G核心网的安全性。特别地，我们测试了三个最相关的开源5G核心网实现：Open5GS、Free5Gc和OpenAirInterface。分析表明，所有被测试核心网均存在至少两种已识别的攻击向量漏洞，这要求在未来的5G核心网开发中加强安全措施。