Honeypots play a crucial role in implementing various cyber deception techniques as they possess the capability to divert attackers away from valuable assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers' preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that generates optimal honeypot allocation strategies within an attack/defense scenario. Our proposed approach takes into consideration the changes in network connectivity. In particular, we introduce a two-player dynamic game model that explicitly incorporates the future state evolution resulting from changes in network connectivity. The defender's objective is twofold: to maximize the likelihood of the attacker hitting a honeypot and to minimize the cost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrating that our game model successfully enhances network security. Additionally, we have proposed additional enhancements to improve the scalability of the proposed approach.

翻译：蜜罐在实施各种网络欺骗技术中发挥着关键作用，因为它们能够将攻击者从价值资产中转移开。网络中蜜罐的谨慎策略性部署不仅应考虑网络方面，还应考虑攻击者的偏好。在网络移动性下的战术网络中分配蜜罐具有重要研究意义。为实现这一目标，我们提出了一种博弈论方法，能在攻击/防御场景中生成最优蜜罐分配策略。我们提出的方法考虑了网络连接性的变化。具体而言，我们引入了一个双人动态博弈模型，该模型明确纳入了因网络连接性变化导致的未来状态演化。防御者的目标具有双重性：最大化攻击者击中蜜罐的可能性，并最小化因网络拓扑变化导致的欺骗和重构成本。我们提出了一种迭代算法来寻找纳什均衡策略，并分析了该算法的可扩展性。最后，我们通过仿真验证了该方法并展示了数值结果，证明我们的博弈模型成功增强了网络安全性。此外，我们还提出了额外优化措施以改善所提方法的可扩展性。