In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner revenue and Dominating-Strategy-Incentive-Compatible (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for users to Bayesian-Nash-Incentive-Compatibility (BNIC). In particular, we propose an auxiliary mechanism method that makes connections between BNIC and DSIC mechanisms. With the auxiliary mechanism method, we design a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) based on the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, and prove that the TFM has both BNIC and collusion-proof properties with an asymptotic constant-factor approximation of optimal miner revenue for i.i.d. bounded valuations. Our result breaks the zero-revenue barrier while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties.

翻译：在区块链系统中，交易费用机制的设计对于矿工和用户的稳定性与满意度至关重要。近期研究证明了在实现矿工非零收益与用户占优策略激励相容（DSIC）的同时，满足防共谋特性的机制存在不可能性。然而，实际应用中矿工的正向收益对激励矿工至关重要。为应对这一挑战，我们考虑贝叶斯博弈场景，并将用户的DSIC要求放宽为贝叶斯-纳什激励相容（BNIC）。具体而言，我们提出一种辅助机制方法，建立了BNIC与DSIC机制之间的联系。借助辅助机制方法，我们基于多项逻辑（MNL）选择模型设计了一种交易费用机制（TFM），并证明该机制在独立同分布有界估值下，同时具备BNIC与防共谋特性，且矿工最优收益能达到渐近常数倍近似。本研究突破了零收益壁垒，同时保持了诚实性与防共谋特性。