We study agents playing a pure coordination game on a large social network. Agents are restricted to coordinate locally, without access to a global communication device, and so different regions of the network will converge to different actions, precluding perfect coordination. We show that the extent of this inefficiency depends on the network geometry: on some networks, near-perfect efficiency is achievable, while on others welfare is strictly bounded away from the optimum. We provide a geometric condition on the network structure that characterizes when near-efficiency is attainable. On networks in which it is unattainable, our results more generally preclude high correlations between outcomes in a large spectrum of dynamic games.

翻译：我们研究在大型社交网络上进行纯协调博弈的智能体。智能体只能进行局部协调，无法使用全局通信设备，因此网络的不同区域会收敛到不同行为，导致无法实现完美协调。我们证明这种效率损失的程度取决于网络几何结构：在某些网络上可实现近似完美效率，而在其他网络上社会福利严格偏离最优状态。我们提出一个网络结构的几何条件，该条件描述了何时能够实现近似效率。在无法实现近似效率的网络中，我们的研究结果更广泛地排除了大量动态博弈中结果之间的高度相关性。