The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division problem, each agent only gains value from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally appear in fair division situations. Branzei et ai. (Branzei et al., IJCAI 2013) generalize the classical ideas of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the classical model to account for externalities.

翻译：摘要：家务分工问题模拟了将一个异质性的不受欢迎的资源公平地分配给多个参与者。在公平分配问题中，每个参与者只从自己的资源中获得价值。然而，参与者同时也可能关心其他人所获得的资源；这些外部性在公平分配情境中自然出现。Branzei等人（Branzei et al.，IJCAI 2013）在扩展传统占有率和无嫉妒条件的同时，将经典模型扩展到考虑外部性。