The Paris Agreement, considered a significant milestone in climate negotiations, has faced challenges in effectively addressing climate change due to the unconditional nature of most Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This has resulted in a prevalence of free-riding behavior among major polluters and a lack of concrete conditionality in NDCs. To address this issue, we propose the implementation of a decentralized, bottom-up approach called the Conditional Commitment Mechanism. This mechanism, inspired by the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, offers flexibility and incentives for early adopters, aiming to formalize conditional cooperation in international climate policy. In this paper, we provide an overview of the mechanism, its performance in the AI4ClimateCooperation challenge, and discuss potential real-world implementation aspects. Prior knowledge of the climate mitigation collective action problem, basic economic principles, and game theory concepts are assumed.

翻译：《巴黎协定》虽被视为气候谈判的重要里程碑，但由于大多数国家自主贡献（NDCs）的无条件性质，该协定在有效应对气候变化方面面临挑战。这导致主要污染国普遍存在搭便车行为，且NDCs缺乏具体的条件性。为解决这一问题，我们提出实施一种名为"有条件承诺机制"的分散式自下而上方法。该机制受《全国普选州际协议》启发，为早期采纳者提供灵活性和激励措施，旨在将气候政策中的有条件合作制度化。本文概述了该机制、其在AI4ClimateCooperation挑战中的表现，并探讨了潜在的实地实施方面。读者需具备气候减缓集体行动问题、基本经济学原理及博弈论概念的知识储备。