Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D, jd, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. Consistency is sometimes formulated in terms of permission. We therefore study permission in the context of justification logic, introducing a notion of free-choice permission for the first time. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes.

翻译：道义逻辑中关于义务一致性的不同概念在标准道义逻辑中会相互归并。在带有义务明确理由的道义逻辑中，情况则有所不同。其强度取决于常量规范以及组合不同理由的可用操作集。我们提出了道义逻辑中的不同一致性原则，并比较了其逻辑强度。我们提出了一种新语义，使得带有公理D显式版本jd的道义逻辑对于任意常量规范都是完备的。一致性有时以许可的术语来表述。因此，我们在道义逻辑的语境下研究许可，首次引入了自由选择许可的概念。随后，我们讨论了与某些道义悖论相关的哲学意涵。