In its pragmatic turn, the new discipline of AI ethics came to be dominated by humanity's collective fear of its creatures, as reflected in an extensive and perennially popular literary tradition. Dr. Frankenstein's monster in the novel by Mary Shelley rising against its creator; the unorthodox golem in H. Leivick's 1920 play going on a rampage; the rebellious robots of Karel \v{C}apek -- these and hundreds of other examples of the genre are the background against which the preoccupation of AI ethics with preventing robots from behaving badly towards people is best understood. In each of these three fictional cases (as well as in many others), the miserable artificial creature -- mercilessly exploited, or cornered by a murderous mob, and driven to violence in self-defense -- has its author's sympathy. In real life, with very few exceptions, things are different: theorists working on the ethics of AI completely ignore the possibility of robots needing protection from their creators. The present book chapter takes up this, less commonly considered, ethical angle of AI.

翻译：在其实用主义转向中，AI伦理这一新兴学科逐渐被人类对其造物的集体恐惧所主导，这一现象在广泛且经久不衰的文学传统中得到了体现。玛丽·雪莱小说中弗兰肯斯坦博士的怪物反抗其创造者；H·莱维克1920年剧作中异端魔像横冲直撞；卡雷尔·恰佩克笔下的叛逆机器人——这一题材中成百上千的其他例子构成了理解AI伦理为何专注于防止机器人对人类施以恶行的背景。在上述三个虚构案例（以及众多其他案例）中，这些悲惨的人造生物——或被无情剥削，或被嗜血暴徒逼入绝境，最终在自卫中诉诸暴力——都得到了作者的同情。而在现实生活中，除极少数例外，情况截然不同：研究AI伦理的理论家们完全忽视了机器人需要其创造者保护的可能性。本书章节正是探讨了这一较少被考虑的AI伦理视角。