In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

翻译：本文提出一个概念模型博弈，用以考察不完全信息博弈中非对称互动的动态特性。该博弈涉及两个能力截然不同的智能体：一个智能体能够采取行动但无法获知博弈状态信息，而另一个智能体虽能完全掌握状态信息，却既不能执行行动也无法观测对手的行动选择。这种二元对立体现了一种极端的非对称形式，我们借此探究不同能力如何影响共同知识的可达性。通过运用克里普克结构和认知逻辑，我们证明在此类条件下，关于当前博弈状态的共同知识将无法达成。本研究推进了在信息与行动能力不均等分布环境中知识战略局限性的理论探讨。