Industrial Control Systems (ICS) rely on sensor feedback to keep safety-critical processes within operational limits. This research presents a hardware-root-of-trust that embeds a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) at the measurement layer to authenticate sensor readings. The architecture combines voltage fingerprinting with a temporal authentication that integrates with standard industrial control system architecture. The research prototypes the PUF integration on a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) water tank testbed using a Simulink-based PUF emulator. The system maintains 99.97% accuracy over a 5.18-hour period of normal operation and flags all injected anomalies, including spike faults, hard-over faults, and hardware trojan scenarios that push the system over to an unsafe operational state. The proposed architecture provides a process-aware, vendor-agnostic approach that can integrate with legacy plants to detect sensor signal degradation or sophisticated supply chain attacks.

翻译：工业控制系统依赖传感器反馈来确保安全关键流程维持在操作限值内。本研究提出一种硬件信任根方案，通过在测量层嵌入物理不可克隆函数来认证传感器读数。该架构将电压指纹识别与时间认证机制相结合，并能与标准工业控制系统架构集成。研究采用基于Simulink的PUF仿真器，在硬件在环水箱测试平台上实现了PUF集成的原型系统。该系统在5.18小时正常运行期间保持99.97%的准确率，并能标记所有注入的异常情况，包括尖峰故障、硬性故障以及将系统推向不安全运行状态的硬件木马场景。所提出的架构提供了一种具备过程感知能力、供应商无关的方法，可与传统工厂系统集成，以检测传感器信号退化或复杂的供应链攻击。