Reinforcement learning (RL) solves the explore-exploit problem by training a learner on reward; its multi-agent, resource-sharing form has an equilibrium allocation as its optimum -- the ideal-free distribution (IFD), the Nash equilibrium of a congestion game. We show a minimal swarm approximates it with no learner at all. We present a decentralized, learner-free method for this problem: agents explore by heavy-tailed (Levy) flights, recruit neighbours to a discovery through a degree-normalized threshold cascade, and disperse as a patch crowds. The method drives the collective to the shape of the equilibrium allocation (pooled spatial matching slope 1.14, R^2=0.61) with no training, no stored parameters, and no reward in its dynamics; it reaches this as a self-organized attractor and holds it, re-finding it when the resources move -- though it reaches the shape, not the exact equilibrium, and stays measurably exploitable (Nash-gap 1.46). Coupling recruitment to movement causes the allocation: removing it collapses the matching (slope 0.006). Against Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) learners (feedforward, centralized-critic, graph message-passing, and recurrent) trained in the same sensing-limited environment, the method at zero training is the only arm left unbiased w.r.t. the IFD gradient (slope ~1, CI containing 1, vs learners 0.69-0.97, all under-concentrating) and ties the best learner's harvest where resource is clustered, while the learner collects more where resource is scarce (0.33 vs 0.22) and holds a tighter per-capita intake. Learning buys precision and transfer across reward structures, not a better allocation shape. A companion paper develops the mechanism.

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