Power-domain non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) remains a widely studied technique for improving spectral efficiency and supporting dense connectivity in beyond-5G and 6G networks. Its main operating mechanisms, however, depend on the integrity of channel-state information (CSI). Power allocation, user ordering, pairing, clustering, and beamforming can all be distorted when the CSI consumed by the base station is deliberately biased rather than merely noisy. This article examines false CSI as an attack surface in power-domain NOMA. We organize the threat space using a compact taxonomy with two primary axes: magnitude, which distinguishes underreporting from overreporting, and ordering effect, which distinguishes order-preserving, boundary, and order-reversing attacks. We then show how coordinated false- CSI behavior, group-changing attacks, direction forgery, pilot spoofing, training-phase injection, and RIS-induced channel manipulation extend this basic taxonomy. Finally, we map each attack family to system-level impacts on power allocation, SIC reliability, scheduler behavior, fairness, throughput, and secrecy. The central message is that false CSI should be treated not only as a channel-estimation problem, but also as a control-input integrity problem for 6G NOMA.

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