A correctly governed LLM agent can reach a state in which neither continuing execution nor automatically halting is admissible: the system has detected a persistent failure of its observability or drift-detection layer, but cannot itself decide who has the authority to resume, deny, or recalibrate the deployment. We call this an identity-bound governance event and formalise the mechanism that resolves it. We introduce the Accountability Proof Block (APB): a system-constructed evidence block, a human-supplied decision block, and an ed25519 signature binding both to a registered principal. The system cannot forge the signature, and the principal cannot alter the evidence undetected. We prove four theorems: Protocol-Bounded Governance Completeness, Non-Repudiability, Impossibility of Anonymous Re-Authorization, and Finite-Time APB Construction Termination. The implementation uses RFC 8785 JSON canonicalization and a UUID4-based replay predicate. Empirically, governance completeness holds over 3,812 halt events with zero unresolved cases; the verifier detects 100% of 1,800 attacks across 9 adversarial vectors; a k-of-n multi-principal variant shows 0 false acceptances in 2,000 single-key capture attempts. A study of six open LLMs finds the drift threshold T* stable within model (sigma/T* < 2%) but varying across models, refuting size-monotonicity: the largest model did not drift. T* must therefore be measured per deployment, and the APB is the vehicle by which that threshold yields accountable authority transfer.

翻译：暂无翻译