A coalition that deviates once can profit many times when what it sells keeps working. In a threshold-encrypted mempool, a leading defense against maximal extractable value (MEV), a quorum of the decryption committee that sells its decryption capability to a front-runner exposes every later block that the capability still decrypts. We ask how large a penalty, such as slashable stake, deters this kind of collusion. In our repeated game, a single leak by any coalition in a monotone family of authorized coalitions (for example, any $k$ of the $n$ committee members) unlocks a set of future rounds, costs a one-time penalty, and ends the coalition's participation. We show that every dynamic deviation reduces to choosing a leak time, so deterrence holds if and only if each coalition's penalty covers the largest discounted value that a single leak reaches. Without discounting, over $T$ rounds of unit value full reuse needs a penalty of $T$ while binding each leak to its own round needs $1$, so no penalty that is constant in the horizon deters unbounded reuse; a reuse window of $w$ rounds costs at most $w$ times the largest per-round value. The cheapest profile of per-party stakes that deters every coalition solves a covering linear program. For blockchain design, per-epoch keys cut the required stake from the value of a key's lifetime to the value of one epoch; we calibrate the gap on Ethereum front-running data and place Ferveo and Shutter in the model. The analysis extends to sealed-bid auctions, multi-authority voting, and federated learning under a shared key.

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