This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.

翻译：本文为不合作游戏提出了一个新的平衡概念“严酷的完美平衡”,由一系列参与者组成,包括三种类型的扰动。这种平衡(在对称混合战略和纯战略中)证明存在,并满足了可接受性、总体稳健性和事后稳健性等重要特性。这些特性加强了相关平衡,导致大量代理人之间关于战略互动的广泛文献。对拥堵游戏和潜在游戏的描述性应用被提出。在费用功能严格增加的拥堵游戏中,我们表明存在一种独特的对称性强健完美平衡。