Long-chain agent execution fails exponentially in environments designed for human tolerance: with per-step determinism $δ< 1$, $k$-step chain success degrades as $δ^k$. The AGI-to-ASI scaling debate (Genewein et al., 2026) has so far framed progress as a race between compute growth and a list of frictions (data wall, abstraction barrier, embodied bottleneck, multi-agent trust); we argue that environment determinism is a complementary binding axis cutting across all four, for the broad class of agentic AI tasks whose outcomes are verifiable economically, physically, or through multi-party settlement. Three formal results pin down the regime: a Determinism-Efficiency Bound on chain-task success, a Verifier-Goodharting Floor on flywheel ceilings under imperfect rewards, and a convergence condition for environment-side skill evolution. We operationalise the framework as a Supply Certainty Index (SCI) over five measurable properties, a five-level Determinism Maturity Model (DMM) as adoption ladder, and a falsifiable open-question programme (OQ1-OQ5) with explicit null results that would force retraction. The position is platform-agnostic. We engage three competing positions: sim-to-real sufficiency, alignment sufficiency, and AI-as-normal-technology.

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