Large language models (LLMs) are becoming routine instruments of scientific research, assisting with literature synthesis, hypothesis development, coding, and formal reasoning. Their use raises a central epistemic question: when parts of scientific reasoning are delegated to an artificial system, what conditions must remain under human control for the resulting knowledge claims to retain epistemic legitimacy and accountable authorship? This paper develops a normative and conceptual framework for analyzing such delegation. Scientific reasoning is treated as a distributed process in which the origin of a contribution may vary between human and machine, while responsibility for its acceptance into the scientific record remains human. The framework distinguishes content origin $O(g)$, completion of human verification $V(g)$, responsibility assignment $R(g)$, accountable human ownership $M(g)$, and epistemic outcome $E(g)$. These constructs separate the provenance of a claim from the process by which it is checked, the epistemic outcome of that checking, and the human responsibility attached to its disposition. The central proposition is that the ethical boundary of LLM-assisted research is determined primarily by adequate verification and accountable human ownership rather than by the degree of machine involvement itself. On this basis, the paper develops the notion of an \emph{epistemic audit}: a structured record of delegation, verification, provenance, and responsibility intended to make AI-assisted reasoning transparent and reviewable. The resulting framework provides a formal vocabulary for distinguishing responsible cognitive delegation from the transfer or neglect of epistemic responsibility in scientific research.

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