The emergence of novel the dummy data injection attack (DDIA) poses a severe threat to the secure and stable operation of power systems. These attacks are particularly perilous due to the minimal Euclidean spatial separation between the injected malicious data and legitimate data, rendering their precise detection challenging using conventional distance-based methods. Furthermore, existing research predominantly focuses on various machine learning techniques, often analyzing the temporal data sequences post-attack or relying solely on Euclidean spatial characteristics. Unfortunately, this approach tends to overlook the inherent topological correlations within the non-Euclidean spatial attributes of power grid data, consequently leading to diminished accuracy in attack localization. To address this issue, this study takes a comprehensive approach. Initially, it examines the underlying principles of these new DDIAs on power systems. Here, an intricate mathematical model of the DDIA is designed, accounting for incomplete topological knowledge and alternating current (AC) state estimation from an attacker's perspective. Subsequently, by integrating a priori knowledge of grid topology and considering the temporal correlations within measurement data and the topology-dependent attributes of the power grid, this study introduces temporal and spatial attention matrices. These matrices adaptively capture the spatio-temporal correlations within the attacks. Leveraging gated stacked causal convolution and graph wavelet sparse convolution, the study jointly extracts spatio-temporal DDIA features. Finally, the research proposes a DDIA localization method based on spatio-temporal graph neural networks. The accuracy and effectiveness of the DDIA model are rigorously demonstrated through comprehensive analytical cases.

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