E-commerce platforms usually present an ordered list, mixed with several organic items and an advertisement, in response to each user's page view request. This list, the outcome of ad auction and allocation processes, directly impacts the platform's ad revenue and gross merchandise volume (GMV). Specifically, the ad auction determines which ad is displayed and the corresponding payment, while the ad allocation decides the display positions of the advertisement and organic items. The prevalent methods of segregating the ad auction and allocation into two distinct stages face two problems: 1) Ad auction does not consider externalities, such as the influence of actual display position and context on ad Click-Through Rate (CTR); 2) The ad allocation, which utilizes the auction-winning ad's payment to determine the display position dynamically, fails to maintain incentive compatibility (IC) for the advertisement. For instance, in the auction stage employing the traditional Generalized Second Price (GSP) , even if the winning ad increases its bid, its payment remains unchanged. This implies that the advertisement cannot secure a better position and thus loses the opportunity to achieve higher utility in the subsequent ad allocation stage. Previous research often focused on one of the two stages, neglecting the two-stage problem, which may result in suboptimal outcomes...

翻译：电商平台通常针对用户每次页面浏览请求，呈现一个由若干自然商品和一条广告混合排序的结果列表。该列表作为广告拍卖与分配流程的最终输出，直接影响平台广告收入与商品交易总额（GMV）。具体而言，广告拍卖机制决定展示哪条广告及对应支付价格，而广告分配机制则决定广告与自然商品的展示位置。当前将广告拍卖与分配分离为两个独立阶段的通行方法面临两大问题：1）广告拍卖未考虑外部性因素，如实际展示位置与上下文对广告点击率（CTR）的影响；2）采用拍卖胜出广告支付价格动态确定展示位置的广告分配机制，无法维持广告的激励相容性（IC）。例如，在使用传统广义第二价格（GSP）的拍卖阶段，即使胜出广告提高出价，其支付价格仍保持不变。这意味着该广告无法通过调价获取更优展示位置，从而在后续广告分配阶段丧失获得更高效用的机会。现有研究多聚焦单一阶段而忽略两阶段耦合问题，可能导致次优结果……