We propose a new voting algorithm based on the pairwise majority-comparison matrix derived from voters' preference profiles. We show that this algorithm induces exactly the winner set of the Schulze rule (Schulze, 1997). Our algorithm successively eliminates weaker candidates in terms of all-pairs comparisons, thereby reflecting a dual spirit to Condorcet's original idea of splitting preference cycles (de Condorcet, 1785). We further show that the direct sum of the survival sets obtained at each elimination round coincides with the Schwartz set (Schwartz, 1972). These two equivalence results provide a formal mathematical foundation for the ``folklore'' relationship between the Schulze winner set and the Schwartz set, as well as a new Condorcetian interpretation of the Schulze winner set.

翻译：基于选民偏好剖面导出的成对多数比较矩阵，我们提出了一种新的投票算法。我们证明该算法恰好生成Schulze规则（Schulze, 1997）的获胜者集合。该算法通过所有配对比较逐步淘汰较弱的候选者，从而体现了与孔多塞最初拆分偏好循环思想（de Condorcet, 1785）对偶的精神。我们进一步证明，每轮淘汰中存活集合的直和与Schwartz集合（Schwartz, 1972）一致。这两个等价性结果为Schulze获胜者集合与Schwartz集合之间的“民间传说”关系提供了形式化的数学基础，同时也为Schulze获胜者集合提供了新的孔多塞式解释。