We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the school's internal ranking process. In particular, we define acceptable choices as candidates ranked above a top percentile of the accepted cohort by a sufficient number of evaluators. Stability is then defined in terms of acceptability: accepted candidates must receive strong support, while rejected candidates receive at most weak support. Since exact acceptability and stability may not exist, we construct approximately stable outcomes using a new equilibrium concept that combines matching with a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences, providing a flexible, equilibrium-based framework for committee-based matching markets.

翻译：本文研究一个受学校选择启发的多对一匹配模型，其中学校使用多个排序而非单一优先级顺序来评估申请者。我们运用社会选择准则对每所学校的评估过程进行建模，以反映学校内部的排序机制。具体而言，我们将可接受选择定义为在足够多评估者排序中位于录取群体前百分位之上的候选人。稳定性则根据可接受性进行定义：被录取的候选人必须获得强支持，而被拒绝的候选人至多获得弱支持。由于精确的可接受性与稳定性可能不存在，我们通过结合匹配与基于序数偏好的林达尔均衡的新均衡概念，构建近似稳定的匹配结果，从而为基于委员会的匹配市场提供一个灵活且基于均衡的理论框架。