Philosophical research in AI has hitherto largely focused on the ethics of AI. In this paper we, an ethicist of belief and a machine learning scientist, suggest that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI - the epistemology of AI, and in particular an ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief, a field that has been defined in various ways, to refer to a sub-field within epistemology. This subfield is concerned with the study of possible moral, practical, and other non-alethic dimensions of belief. And in this paper, we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what agents - both human and artificial - ought to believe, rather than with descriptive questions concerning whether certain beliefs meet various evaluative standards such as being true, being justified or warranted, constituting knowledge, and so on. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI; morally owed beliefs; pragmatic and moral encroachment on AI beliefs; and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven't yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI.

翻译：迄今，AI的哲学研究主要聚焦于AI伦理学。在本文中，我们——一位信念伦理学家与一位机器学习科学家——提出需要开拓AI哲学研究的新领域：AI知识论，特别是AI信念伦理学。在此，我们将信念伦理学（该领域有不同界定方式）视为知识论的一个子领域，关注信念可能具有的道德、实践及其他非真值维度。本文主要探讨信念伦理学中的规范性议题——即智能体（包括人类与人工智能）应当相信什么——而非描述性议题（如某些信念是否符合真、确证、正当化等评价标准，是否构成知识等）。我们提出人类信念伦理学现有研究中可应用于AI信念伦理学的四个主题：AI的信念性错误、道德应得信念、AI信念的实用与道德侵入、以及AI信念的道德责任。同时，我们指出两个尚未被普遍视为AI信念伦理学研究的新兴哲学领域，但因探究信念的道德与实践维度而实际属于该领域：AI的认知与伦理去殖民化，以及AI中的认知不公正。