In traditional blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners) regardless of the contribution of forwarding behaviors of light nodes. However, the lack of forwarding incentive reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the energy-constrained Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for forwarding and validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction mechanism consists of two auction models: the forwarding auction and the validation auction. In the forwarding auction, forwarding nodes use Generalized First Price (GFP) auction to choose transactions to forward. Besides, forwarding nodes adjust the forwarding probability through a no-regret algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation auction, full nodes select transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block. We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility (IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE). Especially, we derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and spectrum resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network.

翻译：在传统区块链网络中，交易费用仅分配给全节点（即矿工），而忽略了轻节点转发行为的贡献。然而，转发激励的缺失降低了轻节点中继交易的意愿，尤其在能量受限的移动自组织网络（MANET）中尤为突出。本文针对无线区块链网络提出一种新颖的双重拍卖机制，以分配交易转发与验证行为的费用。该双重拍卖机制包含两个拍卖模型：转发拍卖与验证拍卖。在转发拍卖中，转发节点采用广义第一价格（GFP）拍卖选择待转发交易。此外，转发节点通过无遗憾算法调整转发概率以提升效率。在验证拍卖中，全节点使用维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯（VCG）机制选择交易以构建区块。我们证明所设计的双重拍卖机制满足激励相容性（IC）、个体理性（IR）与计算高效性（CE）。特别地，我们推导了社会最优拍卖与所提拍卖之间社会福利差异的上界。大量仿真结果表明，所提双重拍卖机制在不牺牲无线区块链网络吞吐量与安全性的前提下，降低了能量与频谱资源消耗，并有效提升了社会福利。