Since the seminal paper by Tversky and Kahneman, the conjunction fallacy has been the subject of multiple debates and become a fundamental challenge for cognitive theories in decision-making. In this article, we take a rather uncommon perspective on this phenomenon. Instead of trying to explain the nature or causes of the conjunction fallacy (intensional definition), we analyze its range of factual possibilities (extensional definition). We show that the majority of research on the conjunction fallacy, according to our sample of experiments reviewed which covers literature between 1983 and 2016, has focused on a narrow part of the a priori factual possibilities, implying that explanations of the conjunction fallacy are fundamentally biased by the short scope of possibilities explored. The latter is a rather curious aspect of the research evolution in the conjunction fallacy considering that the very nature of it is motivated by extensional considerations.

翻译：自Tversky和Kahneman开创性论文以来，合取谬误一直是多重辩论的主题，并成为决策认知理论的基本挑战。本文对这一现象采取了相当罕见的视角。我们并未试图解释合取谬误的本质或成因（内涵定义），而是分析其事实可能性的范围（外延定义）。根据我们对1983年至2016年间文献的样本实验回顾，研究表明有关合取谬误的大多数研究仅关注先验事实可能性的狭窄部分，这意味着对合取谬误的解释从根本上受到所探索可能性范围狭窄的偏见。考虑到合取谬误的本质恰恰源于外延考量，这一现象在合取谬误研究演化中显得颇为奇特。