This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between a sender and receiver, departing from conventional models by focusing on the receiver's perspective. We study two models, one with transparent motives and another one in which the receiver can \emph{filter} the information that is accessible by the sender. We give a geometric characterization of the best receiver equilibrium under transparent motives and prove that the receiver does not benefit from filtering information in this case. However, in general, we show that the receiver can strictly benefit from filtering and provide efficient algorithms for computing optimal equilibria. This innovative analysis aligns with user-based platforms where receivers (users) control information accessible to senders (sellers). Our findings provide insights into communication dynamics, leveling the sender's inherent advantage, and offering strategic interaction predictions.

翻译：本文考虑了发送者与接收者之间廉价谈话互动的动态过程，突破传统模型从接收者视角展开分析。我们研究了两种模型：一种具有透明动机，另一种允许接收者对发送者可获取的信息进行过滤。在透明动机模型下，我们给出了最优接收者均衡的几何特征描述，并证明了在此情况下接收者无法从信息过滤中获益。然而，我们证明了一般情况下接收者可通过信息过滤严格获益，并提供了计算最优均衡的高效算法。这一创新性分析与基于用户的平台（其中接收者即用户控制着发送者即卖家可获取的信息）相契合。我们的研究结果为沟通动态提供了洞见，有助于平衡发送者的固有优势，并提供策略性互动的预测。