We propose a novel quantum-resistant mutual authentication scheme for radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems. Our scheme uses lattice-based cryptography and, in particular, achieves quantum-resistance by leveraging the hardness of the inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS) problem. In contrast to prior work, which assumes that the reader-server communication channel is secure, our scheme is secure even when both the reader-server and tag-reader communication channels are insecure. Our proposed protocol provides robust security against man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, impersonation, and reflection attacks, while also ensuring unforgeability and preserving anonymity. We present a detailed security analysis, including semi-formal analysis and formal verification using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool. In addition, we analyze the storage, computation, and communication costs of the proposed protocol and compare its security properties with those of existing protocols, demonstrating that our scheme offers strong security guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first quantum-resistant authentication protocol for RFID systems that comprehensively addresses the insecurity of both the reader-server and tag-reader communication channels.

翻译：本文提出一种新型量子安全双向认证方案，适用于射频识别(RFID)系统。该方案采用格密码学，通过利用非齐次短整数解(ISIS)问题的难解性实现量子安全性。与假设读写器-服务器通信信道安全的现有工作不同，本方案在读写器-服务器和标签-读写器通信信道均不安全的情况下依然保持安全性。该协议能够有效抵御中间人(MITM)攻击、重放攻击、冒充攻击和反射攻击，同时保证不可伪造性和匿名性。我们进行了详细的安全分析，包括半形式化分析以及使用互联网安全协议与应用自动验证(AVISPA)工具的形式化验证。此外，我们分析了该协议的存储、计算和通信开销，并将其安全特性与现有协议进行对比，证明本方案具备更强的安全保障能力。据我们所知，本文是首个全面解决读写器-服务器和标签-读写器双信道不安全问题的RFID系统量子安全认证协议。