Statistics is sometimes described as the science of reasoning under uncertainty. Statistical models provide one view of this uncertainty, but what is frequently neglected is the invisible portion of uncertainty: that assumed not to exist once a model has been fitted to some data. Systematic errors, i.e. bias, in data relative to some model and inferential goal can seriously undermine research conclusions, and qualitative and quantitative techniques have been created across several disciplines to quantify and generally appraise such potential biases. Perhaps best known are so-called risk of bias assessment instruments used to investigate the likely quality of randomised controlled trials in medical research. However, the logic of assessing the risks caused by various types of systematic error to statistical arguments applies far more widely. This logic applies even when statistical adjustment strategies for potential biases are used, as these frequently make assumptions (e.g. data missing at random) that can never be guaranteed in finite samples. Mounting concern about such situations can be seen in the increasing calls for greater consideration of biases caused by nonprobability sampling in descriptive inference (i.e. survey sampling), and the statistical generalisability of in-sample causal effect estimates in causal inference; both of which relate to the consideration of model-based and wider uncertainty when presenting research conclusions from models. Given that model-based adjustments are never perfect, we argue that qualitative risk of bias reporting frameworks for both descriptive and causal inferential arguments should be further developed and made mandatory by journals and funders. It is only through clear statements of the limits to statistical arguments that consumers of research can fully judge their value for any specific application.

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