We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers information over time, and hence her posteriors' sequence forms a discrete-time martingale. The sender commits to a dynamic revelation policy to persuade the agent to adopt a product. We demonstrate that under the assumption that the sender's martingale possesses Blackwell-preserving kernels, the family of optimal strategies for the sender takes an interval form; namely, in every period the set of martingale realizations in which adoption occurs is an interval. Utilizing this, we prove that if the sender is sufficiently impatient, then under a random walk martingale, the optimal policy is fully transparent up to the moment of adoption; namely, the sender reveals the entire information she privately holds in every period.

翻译：本文提出了一种动态产品采纳劝说模型，涉及一个逐渐学习状态的不耐烦且部分知情的发送者。在该模型中，发送者随时间收集信息，因此其后验序列构成离散时间鞅。发送者通过承诺动态信息披露策略来说服智能体采纳产品。我们证明，在发送者鞅具有布莱克威尔保持核的假设下，发送者的最优策略族呈区间形式；即在每个时期中，发生采纳行为的鞅实现集合构成一个区间。基于此，我们证明若发送者足够不耐烦，则在随机游走鞅条件下，最优策略在采纳发生前具有完全透明性；即发送者在每个时期都会披露其私下持有的全部信息。