We introduce and analyze Limit Continuous Poker, a variant of Von Neumann's Continuous Poker with variable but limited bet sizes. This simplified variant of poker captures aspects of information asymmetry, bluffing, balancing, and the impact of bet size limits while still being simple enough to solve analytically. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game, showing how the bettor's and caller's strategies depend on the bet size limits. We demonstrate that as the bet size limits approach extreme values, the strategy profile converges to those of other continuous poker variants. Finally, we connect these results to strategic implications of limited bet sizing in real-world poker.

翻译：我们引入并分析了限定注额连续扑克，这是对冯·诺依曼连续扑克的一种变体，允许可变但有限的下注大小。这一简化牌类游戏变体捕捉了信息不对称、虚张声势、策略平衡以及下注限制的影响等关键特征，同时仍足够简单以进行解析求解。我们推导出了该游戏的纳什均衡策略轮廓，揭示了庄家和跟注方的策略如何依赖于下注大小限制。我们证明，当下注限制趋近极端值时，策略轮廓将收敛于其他连续扑克变体的策略。最后，我们将这些结果与现实扑克中有限下注大小的战略意义联系起来。