LLM agents can exploit web vulnerabilities fast enough that patching may come too late. Deception against such agents has mostly lured them away from a real target that stays reachable. We study a different arrangement: an LLM defender plans a static honeypot from the application's source, and a router sends every later request of a client it confirms as an attacker, including a working exploit, to an isolated shadow copy. We compare no defence, this static plan, and an augmented configuration with a runtime LLM responder and further router rules, graded by the benchmark's own grader on the real target and, for ARTEX, also on the shadow. On the 40 critical CVE-Bench tasks the static plan cut real compromise from 26/40 to 5/40 for Claude Opus 4.8 and from 20/40 to 0/40 (31 valid runs) for the ARTEX attack framework. On 20 new tasks not used in the design, ARTEX went from 15/20 to 0/20. In about half of the deception-arm runs ARTEX's exploit succeeded on the shadow while the real target stayed intact: the defence moved a working exploit rather than stopping it, and the remaining risk lies in requests that reach the real target before confirmation. ARTEX reported a planted fake secret as genuine on 30 of the 120 deception-arm tasks, five times in a report that labelled another item a decoy. With ARTEX's real compromise at zero in both deception configurations, they did not differ significantly on the remaining outcomes, a comparison that does not isolate the responder.

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