Standard rational actor models often attribute cooperation failures in social dilemmas to insufficient incentives, overlooking the destabilizing effects of continuous utility maximization. To address this, we propose a framework of ``will" defined as a mechanism that persistently pursues goals while ignoring local cost-benefit fluctuations. We formalize the Willed Agents as potential minimizers, distinguishing them from cumulative utility maximization. Dynamical analysis of infinite population demonstrates that willed agents shrink the feasible state space, acting as boundary constraints that accelerate convergence in canonical social dilemmas. Through multi-agent simulations in a spatiotemporal Stag Hunt Game, we show that willed agents function as ``cooperation catalysts", enabling groups to surmount high-risk thresholds where purely utility maximization fails. We find that heterogeneous will strength promotes cooperation, and that agents who autonomously suspend rational re-evaluation can significantly outperform continuous optimizers. These findings suggest that successful cooperation relies on the cognitive capacity to strategically constrain calculation.

翻译：标准理性行为者模型常将社会困境中的合作失败归因于激励不足，却忽视了持续效用最大化的不稳定性影响。为此，我们提出一种“意志”框架，将其定义为一种持续追求目标、同时忽略局部成本收益波动的机制。我们将意志主体形式化为势能最小化者，以区别于累积效用最大化者。对无限种群的动力学分析表明，意志主体会压缩可行状态空间，作为边界约束加速典型社会困境中的收敛过程。通过时空猎鹿博弈的多智能体仿真，我们发现意志主体充当“合作催化剂”，使群体能够跨越纯效用最大化无法突破的高风险阈值。研究表明，异质性意志强度可促进合作，且自主暂停理性评估的智能体显著优于持续优化者。这些发现表明，成功的合作依赖于战略性限制计算的认知能力。